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THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 1
HERMAN J. HERBERT JR.t
"The General Welfare Clause is dead-long live the General Welfare Clausel"--Hrnv A.
WALLA E,2 1936.
" . . . a power as broad as the boundless seas and infinite as the firmament, embracing the
whole field of human desires and human cupidity . . . ."--H, Ry ST, GERoE T-cxr,u
1927.
"The common defence and general welfare, in the hands of a good politician, may super-
sede every part of our constitution, and leave us in the hands of time and chance.'--HuoH
WnLTAmsoN, 4 1792.
I. GENERAL WELFARE-THE CONCEPT
In endeavoring to discover the basic political principle responsible for the
abundance of socio-economic legislation emanating from Washington during
the years of the Roosevelt administration, one is struck by the similarity of
current public pronouncements. He listens to a "fireside chat" by the President
of the United States and hears that "the powers given to Congress to carry out
... the general welfare... can best be described by saying that they were all
the powers needed to meet each and every problem which had a national
character and which could not be met by purely local action."5 Cabinet officers
write of the "theory that the country as a whole, including industry, commerce,
and finance ought to be developed and used for the greatest good for the
greatest number"; 6 that "the outstanding need seems to be for a democratic
mechanism which can direct action in behalf of the general welfare.' 7 A
political author expresses vehemently his desire for "the final creation of a
general government . . . with powers equal to the utmost necessity of the
general welfare."8
Legal and political scholars of every age have agreed that the primary obli-
gation of the state is a broad mandate to provide generally for the peace and
prosperity of its citizens. In the Aristotelean ideology, the state exists not
f Class of 1938, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Class of 1911 Prize Essay.
The Class of 1911, on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee, established a prize consisting
of the yearly income of the sum of $1500, to be awarded annually for the best essay
submitted by a student in the senior class of the Law School on a legal subject to be
designated annually by the Dean. In the event that in any year no esay submitted Is
deemed worthy of the award, the income of the fund for that year will be devoted to
the purchase of books for the law libraTy.
2. WAraAcE, Wuosa CoNsTrrunioN (1936) 35.
3. Tucker, Judge Story's Position on the So-called General Welfare Clause (1927) 13
A. B. A. J. 363, 367.
4. Debate in the House on the Codfisheries' Bill, Feb. 3, 1792. 4 ELIoT's DEDATES
(1836) 436. Hereafter cited: ELLIOT.
5. Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 351.
6. IcxEs, THE NEw Dz_.rocitAcy (1935) 96.
7. WAL..AcE, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 267.
8. BRANT, STORMr OvER THE CoNsTITUTION (1936) 116, 119.
COMMENTS
merely for the prevention of evil or for the sake of economic gain through alli-
ances for trade, but for the promotion of "a perfect and self-sufficing life, i.e. a
happy and honorable life" to be effected through noble actions, which are the
raison d'etre of the state.9 Plato, advocating a collectivist society, sets up four
great virtues for the state-wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice-and
contends that "everyone having his own" is the great object of government °
Justinian, introducing the Institutes to the Roman people, echoes the Platonic
philosophy, but dwells on the necessity of law to achieve the desired end. The
three fundamental objects of law are: to injure no one; to live morally
(koneste); and to render every man his own. But the end of the state is the
same. Therefore the end of the state is to be secured through law.1' The end
of law, like the end of the state, is therefore moral as well as coercive.
Perhaps the doctrine of the "comiunum bonum" of St. Thomas Aquinas best
epitomizes the great and general end of all government. "Whatever is for an
end," says the great logician, "should be proportionate to that end. Now, the
end of law is the common good (communum bonum); because, that law should
be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the
citizens. Hence human laws should be proportionate to the common good.
Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take
account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because
the community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is
procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for a short time, but
to last for all time, by the citizens succeeding one another."' 2
With the advent of the Christian theology, the concept of a close inter-
relationship between human and divine law came into being. Carried through
the teachings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, it is seen in the early period
of modem history in the argument of Cataneo, Roger Coke, and Follett 3
Coke, rebelling against the school of Hobbes and Rousseau, writes that all law
is to be traced to God and the Natural Law.
"The ratio fi alis, or the end for which God bath ordained kings, is for the
protection of them whom God bath committed to their charge and government;
not only by all just and due means to protect them from the outward violence
and oppression of their outward enemies, but also in peace inwardly and by
all means to suppress all faction and sedition of ambitious men, who would
disturb it.... The end of all government is, either to preserve the governed
inwardly in peace, or to defend them from outward violence of others."14
To Cataneo, the happiness of mankind, insofar as humanly attainable, is the
chief and universal object of laws.
9. Ans=ori. , Ponacs, TM, 9. B.unmR, Por.rac. i. THouGirr OF PLATo ,un A-ror-.
(1906) 282.
10. PLATO, RzE'urzc, IV, 427-435 (Jowett's translation).
11. JusTinau, INs'rTFr.s, I, 1, § 3, translated by Cwmn Cni Lw.m (1865). And
see Introduction to AmP, CiMM LAV or FRAcE (IS64). For thoughts analogous to that
of Justinian, see Sr. AuGus=in, CoNrrssious, iii, 3, and CIcimo, Dr RyErunuc, , 2S.
12. SuansA THEor.oGica, Part II, XCVI, Art. L Cf. Sr. AucusIrnE, DE Civ. D=r, dxi.
13. See Follet's pamphlet, Elements of the Science of Good Goverrmct (1833) for
an extended discussion of the moral aspect of political science.
14. Jus'ncE Vn ircATm FRnr ='i FALSE Focus PuT Ow IT (1660) Book I, 42.
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"Long before there was any possibility for men to fear each other, or to
quarrel about possessions, a natural propensity, and a familiar acquaintance,
inclined them to a reciprocal union, a thousand indispensible wants, which no
man by himself, however laborious or ingenious, could have provided for, must
have linked them together, and a thousand pleasures, to which we are natur-
ally addicted, must have been the cement of society, without which we cannot
attain to any felicity."' 5
Men have created civil society, therefore,
"that they may be less wretched in unavoidable evils and more happy in their
enjoyments . . . legislators may sometimes be wide of the mark, but they
always take the like aim; their intentions cannot be absolutely opposite .... ,0
Blackstone emphasises the necessity of the state for man's protection;
" ... and this is what we mean by the original compact of society . .. namely,
that the whole should protect all the parts, and that every part should pay
obedience to the whole, or, in other words, that the community should guard
the rights of each individual member."' 7
Leo XIII, expounding the Christian theory of the formation of the state,
strikes, perhaps, the mean of all the teachers that precede him:
"When different families .. .unite under the inspiration of nature, in order
to constitute themselves members of a larger family circle called civil society,
their object is not only to find therein the means of providing for their material
welfare, but, above all, to draw thence the boon of moral improvement."18
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE CLAUSES
The Declaration of Independence, setting forth the fundamental objections
of the American colonies to English rule, included the statement that the
British King
"had refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the
public good"
and, in recognition of this primary obligation of the state, the Continental
Congress incorporated into the Articles of Confederation two sections con-
taining the words "general welfare";
"Art. III. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friend-
ship . .. for their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist
each other, against ... attacks made upon them. .... "
"Art. VIII. All charges of war, and all other expenses which shall be in-
15. ESSAYS ON THE NATURAL ORIGIN OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENTS (1753) 8.
16. THE SouRcE, TH SREN rJn AND T=E TRUE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1753) 154.
17. 1 BL. Comm. 47.
18. Leo XIII, Encyclical, Au Milieu des Sollicitudes (1892). In comparison, It is to
be noted that the materialistic collectivist has his conception of the "general welfare".
"In a higher plane of communist society, society may inscribe upon its banners; each
one according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." MARX, I CAPITAL (4th cd.
1907) 567.
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curred for the common defense and general welfare ... shall be defrayed out
of a common treasury .... 11
Expressive of like principles are two portions of the Constitution of the
United States:
"Preamble. We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union . . . provide for the common defense, promote the general wel-
fare ... do ordain and establish this Constitution ......
"Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 1. The Congress shall have the Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.... "1
One notes a great similarity between Art. I of the Articles of Confederation
and the Preamble of the Constitution, and between Art. VIII of the Articles
and Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution. Both the former are statements
of purpose; as it were, editorial comments; both the latter are taxing clauses.
While these likenesses add some weight to a contrary viewpoint, it is mis-
leading to state broadly that the phrase "general welfare" was copied from
the Articles into the Constitution. -20 Under the Articles, the phrase had a
limited meaning, for the reason that the Revolutionary War was the principal
"general welfare" of which the federal government took cognizance; and the
debts arising out of the war were the chief financial burden.' At the time the
Constitution was written, on the other hand, the War was some years in the
past; this, and the fact that the delegates at the Federal Convention were
desirous of forming a union with greater coercive authority,- goes far to
disprove any contention that the similarity of terminology is to denote similar-
ity in the extent of power conferred.
It may be true that the phrase in the Preamble was so copied, for the phrase
was not included in the Preamble until the dosing days of the Federal Con-
vention Since there is no recorded discussion of the Preamble at that time,
19. It is interesting to note that many Constitutions, adopted since 1789 contain the
words "general welfare" or their equivalent. See the Constitution of the Svwss Co"-
EERATiON (1874) Art. II; CONSTrTUTON Or THE AMGENTr NATIo. (193) Preamble;
BRrrTsH NoRT AsarmmcA Acr (Canada, 1867). Under the Cosarruno: or Brm=, Art.
44, the President is required to take an oath that he will "maintain and execute the federal
constitution with perfect loyalty, promote the general welfare of the republic, observe its
laws, and uphold its union, integrity, and independence.'
20. Warren states simply that the words "were operating from Article. of Federation,
in which they were words of mere general import? W REN, MLn=G xr Co:;srra u
(1929) 475n. The alrgument is based upon the view expressed by Afadison in his letter
to Andrew Stevenson in which Madison, like Warren, states that the clauses were copies
from the Articles of Federation and are subject to the same narrow construction. 3 FAn-
RAD, REcoRDs OF THE FEDnRAL CONvENTION (1937) 483. Hereafter cited: FnnAu.'. There
is no reason for the bald assertion. Even if the argument is granted, however, it is to
be noted that Madison admitted that the "general welfare" clause of the Articles was one
of "undefined authority." 4 MAz0soN, Lmrrms A,, WhrrnGs (1922) 126.
21. WA RRE, A=G or Tim Co,;s-rruTo,; (1929) 466-469.
22. In this respect, both the Virginia and Patterson (New Jersey) Plans agreed. 1
FAPmAND, 242.
23. The Preamble was not presented until the report of the Committee on Style was
1938]
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it may be presumed that the phrase was copied from Art. III of the Articles,
Art. III being the "preamble" of that instrument.
The present Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution, however, was de-
bated vigorously during the Convention. Though taxes could be levied by the
Congress under the Articles, there was no means of enforcing collection.2 4 A
"firm league of friendship" existed, and nothing more25 The need for taxation
on a national plane was clearly felt; the clause suffered many revisions as a
result.2 6 In view of the controversy involved in the modern interpretation of
the clause, it is to be noted that the most "radical" propositions were these:
given on September 12th. The Convention closed on the 17th. 2 FARRAND, 265, 650.
There is no reported discussion of the Preamble by the Committee on Detail-a strong
indication of the fact that the preamble was intended to convey no substantive power
whatever. In a proposed draft of the Constitution as presented to the Convention on
August 6, the following is the Preamble: "We, the people of the states of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island . . . do ordain, declare, and establish the following Con-
stitution for the government of ourselves and our posterity." Ibid. 152. In this form,
the Preamble was passed unanimously on August 7. Ibid. 196. On September 10, the
draft of the entire instrument was passed to the Committee on Style. The Committee
revised the whole draft, and presented the Preamble in its present form. Ibid. 565.
24. OGO AND RAY, INTRODUCTION To AMEICAN GOVEMENT (1932) 29.
25. ARTicLms or CONFEDERATION, Art. III.
26. The clause in the Patterson Plan, note 27, infra, was the first presented. 1 FARn-
RAND, 242. Wilson of Pennsylvania a few days later presented a clause reading: "The
legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises .... " 2 FARRAND, 167. Discussion of the latter clause concerned only
the limits of the power to tax and the possibility of taxing imports; there was no mention
of the spending power of Congress. 2 FAuAND, 305-308. (However, the words "general
welfare" were not as yet included). To the Wilson Clause the words "for the payment
of the debts and necessary expenses of the United States" were later added. Ibid. 366.
Subsequent revisions changed the clause to read, first: "the legislature shall fulfill the
engagements and discharge the debts of the United States and shall have the power to
lay and collect taxes, duties, and imposts, and excises" (ibid. 382); second: "all debts
contracted and engagements entered into, by or under the authority of the Congress shall
be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation"
(ibid. 414); and third: its present form (ibid. 493). Another clause was reported by a
'committee which had decided favorably toward the assuming by the federal government
of the state war debts. It read: "The legislature of the United States shall have full power
to fulfill the engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge as
well the debts of the United States, as the debts incurred by the several states during the
late War, for the common defense and general welfare." (ibid. 352.) Sherman's clause,
supra, was defeated as "unnecessary" (ibid. 414). It is noteworthy that none of the dis-
cussion on any of these clauses directly concerned the spending power. (ibid. 305-308,
412-414).
An interesting argument over the original construction of the clause will be found in
an address by Congressman David J. Lewis of Maryland before the House of Representa-
tives in 1935, in the CONGRESSioNAL RECORD, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. Vol. 79, Part 10, pp.
10399-10411. Congressman Lewis argues that when the clause was read to the Constitu-
tional Convention on September 12, from the desk copy of General Washington, the clause
contained a semicolon after the words "to pay the debts of the United States", and that
the printed convention copies of the clause likewise contained the semicolon, He attributes
the change in punctuation to a mistake of the copyist who prepared copies of the finished
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"Resolved, that... Congress be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue
... to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper and ex-
pedient.12 7
"(Congress shall have the power to tax) for the payment of said (war) debts
and for defraying the expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense
and general welfare." 28
The first was part of the Patterson Plan.-' O The author of the second was
Roger Sherman, of Massachusetts, who was the author also of the present
clause.30 It would seem that both would have conveyed a broad power to spend
and nothing more. Since there was no debate over the clause when it was
presented in its present form,31 however, there is no means of judging the extent
of power conferred by it originally.
III. THE SCOPE OF TE CLAUSES
It is immediately evident, in view of the federal nature of the American
union, that the concept of general welfare, in the United States, will have to
be "split" into that welfare for which the states on the one hand, and the
federal government on the other, can provide. Federal and state governments
operate concurrently throughout the nation. For some purposes the states are
sovereign, for others subordinate; -32 they retain, under the Constitution, all
powers not granted to the national government.33 Our object is to ascertain
the limits of the powers of Congress, under the clauses of the Constitution
quoted above, to legislate for general welfare of the people of the United States.
Constitution for publication. It is true that if a semicolon were put in place of the
comma in the clause as it is read at present, the resulting disjunction would make it
possible to separate the "general welfare of the United States" from the power to lay
and collect taxes; and the present attempted expansion of Congressional power might be
sustained constitutionally. We submit, however, that the argument has never been fully
sustained; in any event, its force is extremely weakened by the fact that the clause has
contained the comma, and its grammatical construction has remained unchallenged, for
a century and a half.
27. 1 FAM.NsxD, 243.
2S. 2 FAmusR-, 414.
29. It is noteworthy, in view of the argument that the clauses were copies from the
Articles, that a broad power to spend should have been urged by the smaller states, which
were championed by the Patterson Plan. They feared they would be "deprived of an
equality of suffrage ... and thereby be thrown under the domination of the large states.'
I FARR.,sN, 242 (]Iadison's footnote). The fact that the Patterson resolution was broad
in its application is some proof that there was a desire even in the Convention that the
power to spend should be used widely.
30. BmsnT, SoaRm 0vm = CoNsnrruox (1936) 137.
31. 2 FuA,,-D, 499.
32. Marshall, C. J., in Cohens v. irginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821).
33. U. S. Co~sT., Amend. X: "The Powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respzctively,
or to the people."
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A. THE PREAMBLE
Sir Edward Coke states cautiously that the "rehearsall or preamble" of a
statute is a "good mean" to find out its meaning, and as it were "a key to
open the understanding thereof." 34 The Preamble of the Constitution appro-
priately sets forth the general ideals toward which the Constitution tends, and
refrains from establishing any specific rule of law. It is extremely unlikely that
the present tendency to expand the power of Congress and the executive will
alter this accepted interpretation.35 Judge Story stated the true scope of the
preamble as follows:
"The Preamble can never be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to
the general government or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power
per se. It can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power
expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power
when otherwise withdrawn from the Constitution. Its true office is to expound
the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the
Constitution, and not substantively to create them."80
Story's viewpoint has been universally upheld by later judicial decisions and
constitutional authorities37 and seldom questioned except in the political
authorship of the present day.
B. THE CLAUSE IN ART. I, SEC. 8.
It would be fortunate if as clear a limitation could be set upon the grant
of power given to Congress by the clause in Art. I, Sec. 8. It would seem that
34. COKE, FIRST PART OF Tx IisxrrurS, OR A Co!BsENTAaY UPON LITTLErON (1812)
II, § 103. And see HA GRAVE AND BuTLEm, NOTES TO LORD Cox-'s FIRST INsnruTE (1812)
Book H, note 42.
35. Note the developments in such books as Icxxs, THE Naw DEMocAcY (1935);
WALLACE, WHOSE CONSITUTION (1936) ; and BANT, STORM OVER TiHE CONsTTTION (1936).
36. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE.CONsTmrnON OF THE UNrD STATRS (5th ed. 1891)
§ 462.
37. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 22 (1905):
"Although the Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and
established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive
power conferred on the government of the United States o any of its departments. Such
powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and such as
may be implied from those granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of
the constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign juris-
diction and authority of the United States, no power can be expected to that end by
the United States unless, apart from the Preamble it can be found in some express dele-
gation of power or in some power to be properly implied therefrom." And cf. United
States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425, 430 (W. D. Mo. 1898); COOLLY, CONSTITUTIoNAL LI.ITA-
TIONs (8th ed. 1927) 11; WLOUGIY, ON THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1929) § 41. In
the early years of government under the Constitution, there was expressed the doctrine
that the Congress possessed a general grant of power to legislate for the general welfare.
The fear of such a doctrine can be found in Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
4 ELLIOT (1800) 576; in Jefferson's Opinion on the Bank, 3 WmrmGs (Memorial ed. 1899)
147-149, 179; and in the argument of Burwell in the House during the debate on the
renewal of the charter of the United States Bank (Jan. 16, 1811) 4 ELLIOT (1800) 473.
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from ihe beginning the words "to provide for the general welfare" were sub-
ject to two widely divergent political views.38 The Federalist, desiring a strong
central authority, considered that Congress had the power to tax and spend for
anything within the general welfare and was limited only to the extent that
the tax and expenditure serve a public purpose.P The Republican, interested
in the retention by the states of as great a sphere of authority as possible,
imposed a narrow interpretation, allowing the Congress to tax and spend only
for purposes within the enumerated powers following the clause.40
1. Statuetory Application of the General Welfare Clausc-Ante 1933
Despite the argument over the scope of the clause, there can be seen in
the enactment of statutes by the Congress an ever-expanding field of federal
appropriations. The limits of that field are not yet known with any degree of
definiteness. 4
In an early message to Congress, Washington urged that
"the safety and interest of a free people require that Congress should promote
such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others,'"-
38. A letter of Jefferson is illuminating: "Our tenet ever was, and, indeed, it is almost
the only landmark that divides the Federalists from the Republicans, that Congress has
no unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but is restrained to tho~e specifi-
cally enumerated; and that, as it was never meant they should provide for the welfare
but by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not have been meant they should
raise money for purposes which the enumeration did not place under their action, con-
sequently that the specification of powers is a limitation of the purposes for which they
may raise money.' Jefferson to Gallatin, June 16, 1817, quoted in WAmum, MA=.OG oF
THE CoNSTr O.N (1929) 478.
The political significance of the clauses was argued strenuously in the state conventions
which followed the Philadelphia meeting. See argument in McGuire, The New Deal and
the Public Money (1936) 23 GEo. L. J. 155, 171-179, and in brief for the United States
in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1935), quoted in (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 115 et req.
39. Hamilton is the chief exponent of the Federalist theory: 'it is therefore of
necessity left to the discretion of the national legislature to pronounce upon the objects
which concern the national welfare, and for which, under that description, an appropriation
of money is requisite and prope&. And . . . whatever concerns the general interests of
learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce, are within the sphere of the
national councils as far as regards an application of money." Report on Manufactures,
1791, 4 ELLIOT, 578.
40. The Republican view is epitomized in Madison's opinion: "It will scarcely be said
that (in the Articles) these phrases were ever understood to be either a general grant of
power or to authorize the requisition or application of money by the old Congres to the
common defense and general welfare, except in the cases afterward enumerated, which
explained and limited their meaning, and if such were the limited meaning attached to
these phrases in the very instrument revised and 'remodelled by the present Constitution,
it can never be supposed that when copied into the Constitution, a different meaning ought
to be attached to themY" (1799) Report to the Virginia Legislature on the Virginia Reso-
Zutions, 4 ELLIOT 577.
41. Even during the Federal Convention it was sought to give Congrezs the power to
create a university, to encourage the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries,
and to establish seminaries-all outside the present enumerated powers. 2 Fxsimun, 32.
42. Jan. 11, 1790, quoted in 4 ELLIor 332.
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and added that the advancement of agriculture and commerce needc-l no
recommendation. The Congress agreed that
"agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, forming the basis of the wealth and
strength of our confederated republic, must be the frequent subject of our de-
liberations." 43
On behalf of commerce there was passed during Washington's administration
the Codfisheries Bill,44 providing for the payment of subsidies to those in cer-
tain types of industry, in accordance with the desire expressed by Hamilton in
his Report on Manufactures, given to the Congress in 1791 .
4
(a). Internal Improvements
In 1802, under the agreement whereby Ohio was admitted to the Union,
40
the Congress passed its first measure in aid of internal improvements within
the states. In return for a grant of land to each township, to be utilized for
free schools, and a pledge on the part of the federal government to use five
per cent of the money received from a sale of the public lands within the state
for the construction of roads between Ohio and the seaboard states, Ohio was
required not to tax the public lands which should be sold for a period of five
years after the sale. During the next year Congress provided that three per,
cent of the-net proceeds from land sales in all the states should be turned over
"to such persons as might be authorized by the legislature of the state to be
applied to the laying out, opening, and making of roads within the states. 4 7
Although Jefferson supported the Republican view of the spending power,
48
he permitted and in fact urged an exception in the case of the Louisiana Pur-
chase.49 A reaffirmation of the doctrine that the federal monies could be spent
in aid of internal improvements is seen in the passage of the measure for the
establishment'of the Cumberland Road,5" the subject of many subsequent ap-
propriations and much severe debate. 1
,43. 4 ELLIO 332.
44. 1 ANN. 2ND CONG. 387 (1792).
45. 4 ELLIOT 578; Works (Lodge's Ed.) 151.
46. 2 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (1911) 169-171. Hereafter
cited: RICHARDSON.
The author has depended greatly upon Professor Corwin's excellent treatisc for his
development of the statutory enactments under the General Welfare Clause. Corwin, The
Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 548.
47. 2 RICHARDSON, 169-171.
48. Cf. note 49 supra. While Jefferson early in his administration believed that Congress
should protect agriculture, manufacturing, commerce, and navigation by means within "the
limits of our constitutional powers" (1 RicAiwsoN, 318) and advocated the establishment
of a marine hospital in New Orleans for the treatment of American seamen (ibid. 324),
he later urged that amendments were necessary to authorize expenditures for roads, canals,
river developments, and education (ibid. 444). One question posed by him in 1806, how-
ever, is of merely academic importance at the present time: "To what objects shall
surpluses be appropriated . . • after the entire discharge of the public debt . . . ?"
4 ELLIOT 334.
49. However, the purchase was severely contested in the House. 4 ELLIOT 462-463,
50. 2 RICHARDSON 169-171.
51. YOUNG, A POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE CU MDERAND ROAD, passim.
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In 1817, a bill to set aside the bonus and dividends accruing to the United
States on the shares held by the government in the National Bank as a fund for
internal improvements was debated on the floor of the House. 2 John Calhoun,
advocating passage of the act, mentions other examples of appropriations out-
side the enumerated powers:
"We granted by unanimous vote, or nearly so, $50,000 to the distressed
inhabitants of Caraccas, and a very large sum, at different times, to the St.
Domingo refugees ... at the last session, a considerable sum 'as granted to
complete the Cumberland Road. . . I have introduced these instances to
prove the uniform sense of Congress, and the country, as to our powers; and
surely they furnish better evidence of the true interpretation of the Constitu-
tion than the most refined and subtle arguments. "7 3
The Bonus Bill went to Committee, and the committee, reporting, mentioned
the pledge of funds for a library, for paintings, and for the services of a chap-
lain; " liberal donations to the wretched sufferers of Venezuela"; the despatch
of the Lewis and Clark expedition to the Pacific; and the payment of bounties
under the Codfisheries Bill. 4 The Bonus Bill was passed over Madison's
veto.P5
In opposition to the "uniform sense of Congress" stressed by Calhoun are
two presidential messages, one sent to Congress by Madison with his veto of
the Bonus Bill,56 the other by Monroe with the veto of a bill for the preserva-
tion and repair of the Cumberland Road.67 Specifying his objection, Madison
again sought to limit the "general welfare clause" of Art. I by the enumerated
powers and stated his fear that a broader view would give to Congress a
"general power of legislation, .. the terms 'common defence and general wel-
fare' embracing every object and act within the purview of the legislative
trust."
The objection failed to convince the Congress, in all probability for the reason
that Calhoun and others had not sought to extend the power of Congress
under the clause beyond the field of appropriation.
Mlonroe, on the other hand, was constrained to admit that Congress had
an unlimited power to raise money and a wide discretion in spending it, the
only limitation being that it must be applied for "general, not local
benefit." The power went no further, however; for though Congress might
appropriate ad libitum, it could not gain by virtue of the appropriation any
jurisdictional rights over the improvement for which the grant was made.
Congress could grant money for the construction of a road, but it must be
left to the state to condemn the land, to build the road, and to undertake the
52. 31 ANr. 15TH CONG. (lst Sess.) 451 et seq.
53. 2 WORYs oF CALHOUN (Cralle ed. 1912) 194.
54. 31 ANN. 15TH CONG. (1st Sess.) 451 et seq.
55. 2 Wo=xs or CALHOUN (Cralle ed. 1912) 186. The vote was 86 to 84, a probable
indication of an almost equal division of the Congress as to the scope of the clarke.
56. Feb. 27, 1817; 4 Er.orT, 483.
57. 1822-4 ELLIor, 550, also at 32 ANN. 15IS CONG. (2nd Ses.) 13SO0 et seq. The
Message is Monroe's famous "Views of the President of the United States on the Subject
of Internal Improvements."
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protection of it when completed. More concretely stated, the theory urged was
that the "necessary and proper" clause of Art. I, Sec. 868 was not to be used
in conjunction with the "general welfare clause". Judicial decision has destroyed
Monroe's contention, at least insofar as condemnation is concerned.59
At the present time, the development of roads, canals, railroads, and other
internal improvements may be sustained under the war, postal, or commerce
powers.60 It is submitted, however, that the fact does not alter the force of
the instant argument. The significance and scope of the "general welfare
clause" during the early years of constitutional history is to be determined
largely by the belief of the Congress as expressed in legislation enacted under
the clause,61 since there had not as yet been any pertinent judicial interpreta-
tion.
(b). Education and Agriculture
The enactment of statutes in aid of internal improvements was conducive
to the desire to appropriate money to other fields not included within the
enumerated powers. Aid to both education and agriculture had been urged by
the early presidents.62
It is to be noted that the United States until comparatively recent times
was to a far greater extent an agricultural, rather than an industrial, nation.03
Early appropriations show the interest of the Congress in improving the knowl-
edge of the farmer. In 1838 money was voted for the collection of agricul-
tural statistics; in 1850, for the chemical analysis of vegetable substances. In
58. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, Sec. 8, clause 18: "The Congress shall have the Power . . .
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States. .. ."
59. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896); United States
v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, Kentucky, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th,
1935); both cases holding that if the land is to be used for a public purpose, the United
States may condemn.
60. See 2 RIcnsAmsoN, 760 for opinion of Monroe. Development of railroads through
federal aid was condoned in California v. Central Pacific R.R. Co., 127 U. S. 1 (1888),
the court stating that the Congress has "plenary power" over the whole subject of land
transportation. Irrigation statutes were sustained in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46
(1907), and flood control in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288
(1935); (1936) 5 FoRDHAu L. REv. 114.
61. See Corwin, note 46, supra, at 565.
62. Recommendations of Washington (supra p. 000) and Jefferson (sutpra note 48)
have been noted. Jefferson was of the opinion that an amendment was necessary if Con-
gress wished to found a university (1 RicHtansoz, 444). Madison, in his first message to
Congress advocated the establishment by the Congress in the District of Columbia of a
seminary of learning local in its legal character but universal in beneficial effects. (1
RicHmDsoN 470). In his seventh message the project was suggested again (ibid. $2,
553). In the interest of developing scientific knowledge, John Quincy Adams urged the
establishment of an astronomical laboratory, the present naval observatoly, and the sub-
sidizing of scientific expeditions. (2 ibid. 785).
63. The present Secretary of Agriculture has presented some interesting statistics in his
recent volume, WHOSE CONSrrUTON (1936).
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1852, for the first time, the purchase and distribution of seeds was provided
for; and a few years later Congress published information concerning the
consumption of cotton.64 Noteworthy is the fact that these early appropriations
were made at a time when an unlimited spending power was in disfavor-
the "State's Rights" period of 1830-1860. In 1862, with no discoverable ob-
jection on constitutional grounds, the Department of Agriculture was estab-
lished,65 and in the same year was voted a sum for the study of plant and
animal diseases.0 0
From these few statutes there has developed the huge organization centered
today in the Department of Agriculture. Continued expansion of the field of
agricultural research has been accompanied by consistent increases in the
number of services rendered to the farmer by the national government and
paid for out of the federal monies.67 Until recent years, the desire of Congress
to aid the farmer influenced all grants in aid of education. In 1862, under the
Iorrill Act, land was given to establish colleges,
"where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific or classical
studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as
are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts .... ,s
Again, a presidential veto was of no avail, for Congress overrode the argument
of Buchanan when he urged that there was no real distinction between the land
and the money controlled by Congress, and that since money could not be
appropriated outside the enumerated powers, the use of the land was likewise
prohibited.G9
The Morrill Act was amplified in 1890, and a direct grant of money received
from a sale of the public lands, in contra-distinction to the land itself, was
given to each state and territory establishing colleges in accordance with the
requirements made under the earlier statute.70 In 1900 the final step was
taken, and the appropriation was allowed from general funds.71 In all cases,
64. See Corwin, note 46, supra, at 565.
65. REv. STAT., § 520, 5 U. S. C. A. § 511 (1862).
66. For above and other details, see WAm.As, U. S. Dmr. Ac~RcuTurn, 33 JoM.
HOPKINS STDIES, PaSSiM.
67. Among 'recent statutes may be found the following: 44 SnTA. 1065, 7 U. S. C. A.
§ 146 (1927), ($10,000,000 for the eradication of the European corn-borer); 5O STAT. 57,
7 U. S. C. A. § 148 (1937), Control of insect pests and plant dease; 46 STrT 1469,
7 U. S. C. A. § 426a (1931), ($1,000,000 each year for experimentation in the eradication
of wolves, coyotes, bobcats, etc.); 45 STAT. 593, 7 U. S. C. A. § 415 b, d (1937) (diffusion
of knowledge 'relative to the standardization, grading, etc. of wool); 44 STAT. 840, 7
U. S. C. A. § 421a (1926), 44 STAT. 981, 7 ,U. S. C. A. 422a (1928) (etablishment of
dairying and livestock experiment stations in North Dakota and Tennesee); 43 STr. 243,
7 U. S. C. A. § 404 (1924) ("such sums as may be necessary" for the Bureau of Dairying);
42 STAT. 1519, 7 U. S. C. A. § 64 (1923) (Cotton Standards Act-regulation of cotton
standards and production).
68. 12 STAT. 503, 7 U. S. C. A. § 301 (1862).
69. 5 Rzcx!nnsoN, 548.
70. 26 STAT. 417, 7 U. S. C. A. § 322 (180). Donations amounting eventually to
$25,000 per year were to be made to each state and territory, for the more complete main-
tenance of schools already established, or to be established, under the Morill Act.
71. 31 STAT. 179, 25 U. S. C. A. § 421 (1900). If the appropriation resulting from
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the money is given only where there are taught in the colleges affected subjects
relating to agriculture and the industrial arts.
The Smith-Lever Act of 191472 and the Smith-Hughes Actla of 1917 have
still further extended the power to appropriate in the field of education. Under
the former, agricultural extension work is being promoted throughout the states;
under the latter, the federal government cooperates with the states in the
payment of salaries and training of teachers in agricultural and industrial sub.
jects and home economics.
Recent provision for federal aid has seen a severance of education from
agriculture. The presently-existing National Youth Administration 4 aids stu-
dents in colleges and high schools by grants of money to be placed toward
tuition or support, in return for some type of labor performed in conjunction
with the work of the school. Grants are made to every type of student, and
the study of the subjects formerly required is no longer prerequisite. Very re-
cently there has been requested from the federal government the sum of nearly
one billion dollars for aid to the public school systems of the various states,
in which it is said "glaring inequalities" exist.7 What action the Congress will
take remains to be seen. It would seem that there is no constitutional objec-
tion to the granting of money for the purpose desired.
(c). Miscellaneous Appropriations
A full treatment of the multitudinous application of federal monies under
the head of general welfare is impossible here. It would be well, however, to
cite some of the fields within which the Congress has seen fit to spend.
Since 1879, funds have been voted for participation in, or aid of, com-
memorative expositions."6 Assistance in times of disaster has been given to
Americans at home, 1 and to Americans7" and others abroad. 0 Money has
the sale of lands did not suffice, the deficit could be met out of funds not otherwise
appropriated. An act of 1907, 34 STAT. 1281, 7 U. S. C. A. § 322, increased this supple.
mentary appropriation to $50,000 yearly for each state and territory.
72. 38 STAT. 372, 7 U. S. C. A. § 341 (1914).
73. 39 STAT. 929, 20 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1917).
74. Created by Exec. Order of the President on June 26, 1935, pursuant to Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 115, 15 U. S. C. A. § 728 note.
75. New York Times, Feb. 24, 1938, at p. 2, col.*3. The report shows that grants
to states under present laws will total more than $53,000,000 foY the fiscal year 1938. The
President's advisory Committee on Education states that "federal aid is the only way in
which the difficulties in this widespread and complex situation can be adequately corrected,"
The report asks fo the expenditure of some $855,000,000 in aid of elementary and secondary
schools, improved preparation of teachers, construction of school buildings to facilitate
district reorganization, administration of state departments of education, educational
services for adults, and library service for ru'ral areas.
76. 17 STAT. 203 (1812) ; 19 STAT. 3 (1876) ; 25 STAT. 621 (1888); 27 STAT. 389 (1892);
31 STAT. 1444 (1901); 38 STAT. 77 (1913); 40 STAT. 210 (1921).
77. 3 STAT. 211 (1815) ; 12 STAT. 652 (1862) ; 19 STAT. 374 (1877); 22 STAT. 379 (1882);
40 STAT. 917 (1918).
78. 24 STAT. 384 (1887).
79. 24 STAT. 108 (1886); 42 STAT. 351 (1921) ($20,000,000 for grain for those starving
in Russia).
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been granted to aid polar expeditions so and for observation of eclipses of the
sun. 1
Vocational rehabilitation, as provided for in the present Social Security Act )8
had its forerunner in an act of 1879 which set aside $250,000 as "a perpetual
fund for the purpose of aiding the education of the blind, through the Amer-
ican Printing House for the Blind at Louisville, Kentucky."8 The desire to
aid disabled soldiers after the World War prompted an enactment of 1920
in which the Congress granted to the states on a share-and-share-alike basis
a million dollars yearly for the vocational rehabilitation of persons in industry."4
Nor is the Social Security Act completely novel in its provision for aid to
maternal welfare. The Sheppard-Towner Act of 19218r created a nation-wide
organization "for the promotion of the welfare and hygiene of maternity and
infancy" and appropriated sums to be spent by state agencies in states which
accepted the terms of the Act and duplicated their assigned portions of the
national appropriation.
IV. THE NEw DEAL APPLIES THE GENERAL WELFAnE CLAUSES
A momentary pause is necessary. Were one writing of the scope of the
General Welfare Clauses before 1933, his work would have ended with a men-
tion of the multifarious activities carried on by such governmental agencies as
the Public Health Service,86 Bureau of Education,87 Bureau of Fisheries,13
Bureau of Labor Statistics,f° Children's 0 and Women's0 I Bureaus, Commission
of Fine Arts,0" and others.93 He would mention that the limited scope of the
clause in the Preamble had remained unchanged, that Story's interpretation
still governed; 94 and that on the contrary the scope of the clause in Art. I,
Sec. 8 had been widened consistently. He could have then appended Finis to
his work.
* The short span of four or five years has changed all that. As of 1938, one
80. 22 STAT. 384 (1882).
81. 12 STAT. 117 (1860).
82. 49 STAT. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. Chap. 7, Title X (1935).
83. 20 STAT. 468, 20 U. S. C. A. 101 (1879).
84. 41 STAT. 715, 29 U. S. C. A. § 31 (1920).
85. 42 STAT. 224 (1921).
S6. 37 STAT. 309, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1912).
87. REv. STAT. § 516, 20 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1967).
8S. 32 STAT. 826, 5 U. S. C. A. § 597 (1903); created also the National Bureau of
Standards, Coast and Geodetic Surveys, Patent Office, and Census Office.
89. 37 STAT. 737, 29 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1888).
90. 37 STAT. 79, 42 U. S. C. A. 191, (1912).
91. 41 STAT. 987, 29 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1920)
92. 36 STAT. 371, 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 104, 106 (1910).
93. To the statutes already cited should be added, 43 STAT. (Service in the interests
of conserving natural resources); 50 STAT. 319, 16 U. S. C. A. § 584 (1937), (creating and
continuing the Civilian Conservation Corps). The whole field of activities on behalf of
conservation is within the General Welfare Clause.
94. SToRy, Com aa Trm is ox T=a CoNsTrruTioN or T= UzT STATS (5th ed. 1891)
§ 462. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 22 (1905), quoted note 37, sup'a;
United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425, 430 (D. C. Mo. 1898).
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is but partially finished with any discussion of the clauses here considered, for
wide as the concept of general welfare within the scope of the federal govern-
ment had become in 1933, a staggering extension of the concept has occurred
in the enactment of statutes since the arrival of the Roosevelt administration.
Caught in the throes of a national economic disaster, the administration has
sought, under the shibboleth of giving a "New Deal", to make vast reforms in
the economic and social life of the nation. To alleviate unemployment and to
create an impetus for the return of better business conditions, a vast program
of relief through direct loans and grants to individuals, corporations, and muni-
cipalities was set up under the National Industrial Recovery Act 0 and com-
panion measures.97 The government undertook to aid in the refunding of
mortgages on homes,9 8 and offered to farmers complete facilities for extending
long, short, and intermediate term credit for practically every agricultural
purpose.99 The construction of public works was undertaken in an unprece-
95. The Executive was granted far-reaching powers in the creation of boards through
the Reorganization Bill of 1933. 47 STAT. 446, 5 U. S. C. A. § 126. Such power was
he given over the spending of the public monies that for the first time in the history of
the federal courts complainants have urged that Congress has unlawfully delegated the
power to spend. See Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 208, 219 (App. D. C.
1936).
96. 48 STAT. 195, 7 U. S. C. A. § 607; 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 609b, 701-712, 23 U. S. C. A.
§ 9b, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 55, 901, 903, 940, 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 401-414 (1933).
97. Title H, National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 200, 40 U. S. C. A. § 401
(1933) is modified by the Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937,
49 STAT. 115, 49 STAT. 1608, 50 STAT. 352, 15 U. S. C. A. § 728 note. See Stewart Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 587 (1937), for a concise statement of the amount spent
under these acts up until the time of the case. Loans to corporations and municipalities
were made also through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, created under 48 STAT.
318, 15 U. S. C. A. § 601 (1936).
98. Home Owner's Loan Act, 48 STAT. 128, 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 1461, 1463A, 1463B
(1933) under which the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was created; 48 STAT. 1246, 12
U. S. C. A. § 1702 (1933) created the Federal Housing Administration. Reference should
also be made to the low-cost housing and slum clearance provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, 49 STAT. 2026, 40 U. S. C. A. § 421 (1936). That such statutes
are derived in their inception from the general welfare clause of Article I, Sec. 8 may be
seen in a report of the Attorney-General to the President, rendering opinion as to the
constitutionality of the Home Owners' Loan Act, supra. "Home ownership in the United
States is declining; -home ownership, as a national objective, would be permanently injured
if the thousands of foreclosures taking place should continue . .. funds should be avail.
able to (homeowners) at low cost and in liberal amounts; if funds were provided for
needed home repairs and improvements this would provide work for thousands of the
unemployed .. .granting loans to assist owners in retaining title to their homes is cer-
tainly more closely connected with the general welfare than appropriating funds for the
benefit of a particular group in the community." Opinion of August 22, 1933, 37 OP.
ATTY. GFN. (1933).
99. Farm Credit Administration, created by ExEe. ORD. § 6084 (1933), pursuant to
Reorganization Bill of 1933, 47 STAT. 446, 5 U. S. C. A. § 126. In aid of the farmer also
are the Rural Resettlement program, 49 STAT. 2035, 40 U. S. C. A. § 431 (1936), under
which it is sought to take farmers from unproductive or exhausted soil and transfer them
to more fruitful land under federal aid and supervision; and the Bankhead-Jones Farm
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dented degree. 0 0
Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,101 in order to raise farm
income through curtailment of production, a system of benefit payments to
farmers was instituted, whereby the farmer contracted with the federal govern-
ment to keep within certain limits the amount of his land under cultivation.
The Act was financed through the levying of processing taxes upon processors
of agricultural commodities, the proceeds of the taxes being paid to the
farmers under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture.
Of great import was the enactment of the Social Security Act,10 2 providing
for payment of old-age pensions on a permanent basis, for direct grants in aid
of maternal welfare and vocational rehabilitation, and for a system of unem-
ployment insurance which was to go into effect if a state enacted its own
law in conformity with the requirements set up in the Social Security Act.
Specific taxes -were levied throughout the country to finance the Act, all em-
ployers being required to pay the old-age benefit tax, and those employing
eight or more being required to pay the unemployment insurance levy.
The extent to which the federal government sought to enter the field of
private life and enterprise in the name of general welfare may be seen in the
"Declaration of Policy" of the National Industrial Recovery Act:
"A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and dis-
organization of industry, which burdens foreign and interstate commerce, af-
fects the public welfare, and undermines the standard of living of the American
people, is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign com-
merce which tend to diminish the amount thereof, and to provide for the general
welfare by promoting the organization of industry, . . . etc."10 3
It is to be noted that, without any great distortion of the language of the
statute, its policy can be carried far beyond interstate commerce alone and
Tenant Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 522, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 1000-12 under which rural rehabilitation
activities become a permanent activity of the Department of Agriculture which grants loans
on mortgages, rehabilitates distressed farm families, and engages in the promotion of
land conservation and utilization. For a complete discussion of the latter statute and the
whole field of farm tenancy, see (1937) 4 Iw Anm CoTMraMoRAv PnoDrAHs 423-572.
100. Under Title II, N.I.R.A., 4S STAT. 200, 40 U. S. C. A. § 401 (1933) and the
Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts, 49 ST.%T. 115, 49 STaT. 1603, 50 SrTr. 352, 15
U. S. C. A. § 72S note, and see also 50 STAT. 319, 16 U. S. C. A. § 584 (1937), continuing
the Civilian Conservation Corps and 50 STAT. 320, 16 U. S. C. A. 715e (1937), granting
money to the Secretary of Agriculture for the creation of buildings, dikes, dams, canals,
and such other works as may be necessary in the interest of conservation of natural
resources.
101. 48 StAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 601 et seq. (1933).
102. 49 STAT. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. Chap. 7 (1935).
103. Cited note 96, supra. Provisions of Title I of N.LR.A. relating to codes of fair
competition, 48 STAT. 19, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701, et seq. (1933), were declared unconztitu-
tional in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); held,
the Act under this Title constituted an unlawful delegation of power by the Congrezs to
the President and an attempt to gain control of intrastate commerce, in contravention to
the Tenth Amendment.
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applied to all business, labor, and industry; the clause "and to provide for the
general welfare" is clearly disjoined from any of the clauses referring to inter-
state and foreign commerce.' 0 4
In urging the enactment of such measures as this, the Administration has
demonstrated a belief not seriously urged since the very early period of gov-
ernment under the Constitution. The belief is that the federal government
possesses an independent power to provide for the general welfare, by any
type of legislation whatever, when the matter is national in scope. Both the
President 0 5 and the Secretary of Agriculture10 have sought to justify the
contention by bringing forward a supposed desire on the part of those who
wrote the Constitution to create a form of government which would be suffi-
cient for any national emergency that would arise in the future. By the device
of omission, the clause of Art. I is changed to read "The Congress shall have
the power to lay and collect taxes and . . . to provide for the general wel-
fare."'01 7 At the same time, new scope is sought to be given to the Preamble.108
Even with the words "duties, imposts, and excises to pay the debts and to"
omitted, the clause of Art. I should be made to read "The Congress shall
have the power to lay and collect taxes ... to provide for the common de-
fence and general welfare." Even when the clause, with its proper connotation,
is read in its most liberal sense, as Story'09 and Hamilton'" have stated, the
general welfare may be served by .he Congress only in pursuance of the power
to tax and spend. The legal advisors to the Administration have indicated,
moreover, that the opinion of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture
is not shared by every governmental organ. The brief for the United States
in the "A.A.A. Case" is in direct disagreement:
104. 1 he w riter is aware that his statement is subject to criticism, and that, in a case
where two interpretations of a statute are possible, that should be upheld which will
sustain the constitutionality of the statute. However, his opinion of the intention of drafts-
men of the N.I.R.A. is sustained by the actual practices of the National Recovery Admin-
istration, and by the opinion in the Schechter case, holding portions of the N.I.R.A.
unconstitutional. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 528
(1935).
105. "Having in mind that in succeeding generations many other problems then un-
dreamed of would become national problems, (the framers) gave to Congress the ample
broad powers 'to levy taxes . . . and provide for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States.'" Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted by Somer, Bill for "Reforming" the
Supreme Court (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 351. In contrast, see the words of John W. Davis
quoted by McGuire, The New Deal and The Public Money (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 155, at
173: "No line or syllable of the Constitution gives to the Federal government a roving
commission over the whole field of social betterment."
106. "Changes might come with the years, problems might arise which would drastically
alter the pattern of what constituted 'the general welfare'. Yet the instrument of the
people in their new union provided that such problems might be dealt with. The Con-
stitution envisioned a true nation, to be controlled by the people, and with powers to
deal nationally with national problems." WALLAcE, Wos. Corsrrruniolr (1936) 35.
107. Sei 9uotation in note 105, supra.
108. See note 106, supra. Secretary Wallace's entire volume is based upon a broad
interpretation of the Preamble.
109. STORY, ConSTalr MrA s (1891) §§ 007, 908.
110. Report on Manufacturers (1791), quoted in 4 EL~ior 578.
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"Three different theories exist as to the proper interpretation to be given to the
General Welfare Clause; First, it is said that the clause should be construed
as granting Congress power to promote the general welfare independently of
the taxing power. This view has been universally rejected.... That the Hamil-
tonian theory is the correct theory is, we submit, dearly shown by the plain
language of the Constitution."'
V. THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSES IN THE COUTS
New Deal legislation has brought the General Welfare Clauses into a new
judicial prominence. As a result of the present attempt to expand the scope
of the clauses, Supreme Court decisions during the last three years have for
the first time given some indication of the extent to which they may be applied
legitimately by the Congress. The important decisions within the purview of
this work are those involving the constitutionality of the National Industrial
Recovery Act,1 2 the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 19 3 3 11a the Social Se-
curity Act,'- 4 and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935.11r
Each of the decisions has restated the fundamental principle that the Con-
gress possesses no universal power to legislate in every situation that concerns
the general welfare of the United States.'" It may be stated with finality that
111. Brief for the United States in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 136 (1935).
112. Title I, 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 ct seq. (1933), held unconstitutional
in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
Title II, 43 STAT. 200, 40 U. S. C. A. § 401 et seq. (1933), considered in Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 301 U. S. 681 (193S), sustaining federal grants to municipalities for the
construction of municipal power plants, and lower court cases prior thereto: Consumers'
Power Co. v. City of Allegan, Mich., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934); Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 91 F. (2d) 303 (App. D. C. 1937); Arkansas-Mis-louri Power Co. v.
City of Kenneth, Mo., 78 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Missouri Utilities Co. v.
City of California, Mo., 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo. 1934). Contra: Holding grants
unconstitutional: Missouri Public Service Co. v. City of Condordia, 8 F. Supp. 1 (W. D.
Mo. 1934); Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 9 F. Supp. 263
(N. D. Idaho, 1934); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, S. Car., 10 F. Supp. 8 (W. D.
S. C. 1935); Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. City of Centralia, Ill, 11 F. Supp. 874
(E. D. Ill. 1935).
Title II was considered also in United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville,
Kentucky, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935), held, since housing is not a public matter
within the national general welfare, the federal government has no power to condemn
land for a housing project; and in Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 203 (App.
D. C. 1936), in which the Resettlement Administrator was restrained from building a model
community on the same ground as United States v. Certain Lands, supra, and also because
there was an unlawful delegation of the power to spend.
113. 48 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A, §§ 601 et seq. Taxing and benefit payment provizion
held unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
114. 49 STAT. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. Chap. 7 (1935) upheld in Stewart Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937) and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937).
115. 49 STAT. 115, 15 U. S. C. A. § 728 note. The act modified Title II of N.LR.A,
48 STAT. 200, 40 U. S. C. A. 401 (1933), and is involved in the same cases. See note 112,
supra.
116. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, S23 (1935);
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the clause in the Preamble contains no substantive grant whatever, despite
the wishful thinking of those who in recent years have sought to extend the
power of Congress to so many new fields of human activity." 7
A. THE RIGHT TO SUE
The paucity of cases involving the "general welfare" clause of Art. I, Sec. 8
is largely attributable to the cases of Frothingham v. Mellon" 8 and Massachu-
setts v. Mellon,n" which denied the right of the state as parens patriae'2 0 and
of the individual taxpayer 2 1 to sue to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury
from making expenditures under the Federal Maternity Act (Sheppard-Towner
Act) of 1921.122 Holding that the interest of the individual taxpayer was in-
determinate and minute, the Court denied the requisite locus standi to maintain
the suit.123
A more potent factor even than the inability to show direct damage has been
the statement of the courts that the wisdom of federal expenditure is a political
question and not subject to judicial review.124 It has repeatedly been held
that the soundness of policy involved in such legislation is not to be decided
by the Court, but by the Congress. Nor is it to be considered whether good
or harm will result. If the taxpayer wishes to attack such expenditures, he
may do so only through the ballot-box.' 25
Until 1935, the right to seek relief against an appropriation measure had been
granted only in cases where a specific tax had been levied in order to regu-
late126 and where it was alleged that the government sought to condemn land
under an unconstitutional expenditure. 27 Since 1935,128 the courts have granted
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 64 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.
238, 291 (1936). The latter case declared unconstitutional the Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 991 (1935), which sought to regulate prices and production
of bituminous coal by the setting up of a code of fair competition analogous to thoso set
up under the N.I.R.A. See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640-642 (1937).
117. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 528 (1935);
and Carter v. Calter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 291 (1936); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U. S. 11, 22 (1905); United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425, 432 (W. D. Mo. 1898);
WILLOUGHBY ON THE CONSTITTON (2d ed. 1929) § 61.
118. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
119. Ibid.
120. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
121. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
122. 42 STAT. 224 (1921).
123. See 262 U. S. 447, 485 (1923).
124. See Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 32 (1907); Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 240
(1919); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 4147, 482 (1923); Arizona v. California, 283
U. S. 423, 455 (1931).
125. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 482, 488 (1923); Green v. Frazier,
253 U. S. 233, 240 (1919); United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 444 (1896);
United States v. Carlisle, 5 App. Case (D. C.) 143 (1895).
126. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U. S. 20 (1921);
Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1935);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506 (1937).
127. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896); and see United
States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, Kentucky, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
128. It is submitted that courts have extended their iurisdiction Since 1933 because
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complainants the right to sue where there was alleged a direct interference
with business' 29 or threatened irreparable injury; 130 where unlawful delegation
of power to the Executive was alleged; 131 and where a political subdivision
urged that it would be deprived of a substantial portion of its tax revenues. 32
B. THE PRESENT SCOPE OF THE CLAUSE
Although the scope of the clause was not considered directly until the de-
cision in United States v. Butler,133 in 1935, the courts generally, if by in-
direction, upheld the Hamiltonian view of the federal spending power. The
historical expansion of the field of appropriation has been sustained in cases
which either approve specific expenditures or do not question their validity.
Thus, the payment of sugar bounties under a statute then repealed was sus-
tained in an early rase as a "debt" of the United States. 34 Tacit acceptance
of federal funds for aid in a centennial exposition is seen in another decision.Is
The same is true of payments under the Morrill Act'3 0 and the Federal la-
ternity Act;13 7 for the Panama Canal; 138 for national battle monuments; 3 0
the government has attempted to enter more directly into the field of private economic
competition. Thus the government attempted to control agricultural production under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 4S STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. § 601 et .rcq. (1933) and,
to pay farmers for voluntary submission, sought to tax procezzors directly; undet the
National Industrial Recovery Act, Title I, 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1933), it
attempted to have all private business submit to the setting of prices and wage standatds;
and by means of grants to municipalities under N..R.A. Title II, 43 STT. 20, 40
U. S. C. A. § 728 note (1933), it has endangered the business of privately owned power
plants. Since these modes of interference are more direct than taxation alone, suits are
necessarily more frequent.
129. City of Campbell, Missouri v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 55 F. (2d) 560
(1932); but compare Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 301 U. S. 631 (1938).
130. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1922). But compare Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 301 U. S. 6S1 (1938).
131. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936); Franklin Township v. Tugwell,
85 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1936). In the latter case the court decided that Sec. 1 of
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 48 ST,%T. 115, 40 U. S. C. A. § 723 note,
allowing the President to expend for "housing, $450,000,000" was unconstitutional because
(1) the word "housing' was indefinite; (2) Congress had laid down no standard to guide
the Executive in spending and (3) Congrfss had required no findings to be made by the
President before the money could be spent; held, this constituted an unlawful delegation
of legislative power to the President.
132. Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 203 (App. D. C. 1936).
133. 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
134. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1396); see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1, 199 (1824); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
135. Eyster v. Centennial Board of Finance, 94 U. S. 500 (1376).
136. Cornell University v. Fiske, 136 U. S. 152 (1890); Wyoming v. Irvine, 205 U. S.
273 (1907).
137. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
138. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 (1907).
139. United States v. Gettysburg Railway Co., 160 U. S. 66S (1896).
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and for spoliation claims where American shipping had been damaged or
destroyed by the French.140
Only one requirement is made in any of these cases. The tax and expendi-
ture must be for a public purpose. 14' Broad discretion is left to the Congress
by decisions which state that what is a public purpose must be governed mainly
by the course and usage of the government and the objects for which have
been by the history of legislation levied.142
(1). The Case of United States v. Butler
Despite the consistent approbation of federal expenditures the Supreme
Court refrained from examining the "general welfare" clause of Art. I directly
until the decision in the case of United States v. Butler,143 which held uncon-
stitutional the taxing and benefit provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act.144 While the Court expressly refrained from setting express boundaries on
the power to legislate under the clause,14 it did hold that any payment to
farmers coercive in its nature was outside the lawful powers of Congress.1 40
In order that the case might be heard, the question first to be settled was
whether a justiciable issue was presented, in view of the decision in Massarau-
setts v. Mellon.147 Deciding that the taxing and benefit payment provisions
of the Act were part of a single "unauthorized plan"',14 the Court allowed the
suit, stating that the sections of the Act were not capable of being severed and
considered separately. 49 "The tax plays an indispensible part in the plan
140. French Spoliation Claims, 162 U. S. 439 (1896). See also Indiana v. United
States, 148 U. S. 148 (1893); United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411 (1926);
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Autholity, 297 U. S. 288 (1935); (1936) 5 FozMwA.M L. REY.
114 (1936), for other examples of approval of expenditures valid under the General
Welfare Clause.
141. "Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the Legislature upon persons or property
to raise money for a public purpose. . . ." 2 CooLEY, CONsrrrTUoTNA L MITATIONS (1927).
142. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 664 (1874). Like statements will be
found in United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Railway Co., 160 U. S. 668, 680 (1896);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923); and Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 31
(1906).
143. 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
144. 48 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. § 601 et seq.
145. 297 U. S. 1, 68 (1936).
146. 297 U. S. 1, 71 (1936).
147. 262 U. S. 447 (1923); see discussion at p. 000, supra.
148. 297 U. S. 1, 58 (1936).
149. Ibid. The court has appended the following notes: "U. S. DEPARTMaENr or
AGRICULTURE, Achieving A Balanced Agriculture, p. 38: 'Farmers should not forget that all
the processing tax money ends up in their own pockets. Even in those cases where they
pay part of the tax, they get it all back. Every dollar collected in processing taxes goes
to the fa~rmer in benefit payments.'
"U S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, The Processing Tax, p. 1: 'Proceeds of processing
taxes are passed to farmers as benefit payments'."
There is language in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 695 (1892) which might be construed
to uphold the distinction made by the court in the Butler case. In that case the Couft
refused to consider an appropriation contained in the Tariff Act because the appropriating
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of regulation . . . it is the heart of the law." Thus the case is distinguished
from Massachusetts v. Mellon.150
It is submitted that this holding reduces the power of judicial review, in cases
involving federal spending, to a mere matter of form. Let the tax be levied
by one statute, and the proceeds thereof be placed in the federal treasury, to
be withdrawn under a separate appropriation statute, and it would seem that
the doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon will continue to apply, since no tax-
payer has it within his power to prove that the money paid by him was with-
drawn from the treasury and expended under the statute alleged to be uncon-
stitutional. 5'- This contention is borne out in the most recent case involving
the endeavor of a taxpayer to upset a federal expenditure, despite the fact
that the taxpayer-corporation could prove a great threatened financial damage
through the enforcement of the statute attacked.
-2
Mr. Justice Roberts, writing the prevailing opinion, upheld the Hamiltonian
view of the General Welfare clause, conceding that the power to tax and
spend for the general welfare was a separate substantive grant, distinct and
free from limitation by the subsequent clauses in Art. I, Sec. 8. Adopting the
terminology of Story and Monroe, Mr. Justice Roberts places but one restric-
tion on the Clause-that expenditures authorized under it by the Congress be
for national, not local, purposes. The opinion states simply:
provision was separable. The inference might be that if it were inseparable the appro-
priation could be reviewed. The majority opinion in the Butler case discounted the
contention that the tax should be tested as if unrelated to the appropriation, as a "novel
suggestion." 297 U. S. 1, SS (1936).
150. 297 U. S. 1, 59 (1936). The case is put on a parity with the Head Money Cas;,
112 U. S. 5S0 (1SS4). The statute involved in the latter case imposed a tax upon every
alien who entered the United States. The proceeds were put into the general treasury
and were used to pay the expenses of regulating immigration. In the Butler case, the
money was not used directly for regulating agricultural production, but was spent in the
form of benefits to farmers who contracted, it seems, voluntarily with the federal govern-
ment. It is submitted, therefore, that there is not a complete analogy between the two
cases.
151. By amendments of August 24, 1935, and February 29, 1936, (49 STAT. 775, 49
STAT. 1151, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 609b, 612b), the specific appropriation of tax proceeds was
deleted, and "a sum equal to the proceeds" was made available to the Secretary of Agri-
culture; held, taxes levied under the Act as amended were valid. Larabee Flour Muls v.
Mee., 12 F. Supp. 395 (W. D. Mo. 1935). And see Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
301 U. S. 303 (1937), upholding a statute which imposed a tax on the proces.ing of cocoa-
nut oil and provided that all proceeds received from the processing of Philippine products
be held as a separate fund and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Mands; the court
indulges in a "presumption" that "the funds will be appropriated for public purposes and
not for private purposes".
152. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 301 U. S. 6S1 (1938). Petitioner had no right to
sue to restrain the loan of money under the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935
(48 STAT. 115, 40 U. S. C. A. § 728 note), to municipalities for the building of municipal
power plants, since the municipality had the right to borrow. The court states flatly that
the Congress has the right to grant and loan the money, despite pecuniary damage to
petitioner.
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"The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the gen-
eral welfare.' 15 3
Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting and contending that the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act was constitutional, agrees wholeheartedly with this portion of the
prevailing opinion. 54 Thus Hamilton, Story, and Monroe are sustained in
their interpretation of the powers of the Federal Government in the field of
expenditures of the nation's monies.
The Court split sharply, and spared no words, however, over the conse-
quences of the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In a paragraph
startling in its categorical enunciation of a new principle of Constitutional
Law, the majority took what appears to be a sudden shift to the narrow Madi-
sonian view of the General Welfare Clause. Said the Court:
"We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase 'general wel-
fare of the United States' or to decide whether an appropriation in aid of
agriculture falls within it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle
imbedded in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. The act invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statu-
tory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the
powers delegated to the federal government. The tax, the appropriation of the
funds raised, and the direction for their disbursement are ... but means to an
unconstitutional end." 1 5s
Yet, if the Hamiltonian view be adopted, the end is constitutional if the ex-
penditure is within the general welfare. Phrased interrogatively, the question
was this: "Does a severely depressed state in agriculture create a situation af-
fecting the general welfare of the United States?" In the last analysis, the
answer is a matter of opinion, as the vehement opposition of the minority
indicates.'"0
It is to be noted, too, that the states have in many instances been required
to fulfill certain conditions in order to obtain federal monetary grants,'6 1 the
153. 297 U. S. 1, 66 (1936).
154. 297 U. S. 1, 79 (1936). And see Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Central Re-
public Trust Co., 17 F. Supp. 263 (N. D. Ill. 1936) upholding the R. F. C. in giving aid
through loans of federal monies to distressed commercial and agricultural institutions
and railroads.
155. See 297 U. S. 1, 68 (1936).
156. See id., at 79.
157. See opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 et seq.
(1936). Thus, payments under the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act, 42 STAT. 224 (1921),
sustained in Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) and the Morrill Act, 12 STAT. 503
7 U. S. C. A. § 301 (1862), upheld in Cornell University v. Fiske, 136 U. S. 152 (1890)
and Wyoming v. Irvine, 206 U. S. 278 (1907), were conditioned in that the states had to
enact certain statutes or set up administrative machinery or adapt college curricula to the
demands of the Congress.^
Moreover, the states by compact with the federal government [Arizona v. California,
283 U. S. 423 (1930); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223 (1900); Ward v. Race Horse,
163 U. S. 504 (1891)] or with each other [Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 380 (1851);
Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How. 505 (1859); Central R. R. N. J. v. Jersey City, 209 U. S.
473 (1908); Mass. v. N. Y., 271 U. S. 65 (1925)] may contract to give up certain of
their reserve powers.
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money to be spent in activities within the reserved powers of the states. In
all instances, the states have willingly accepted performance. This limitation
upon the federal power to spend poses one of the great problems yet to be an-
swered by judicial decision. Apparently, under the Buitlcr case, the validity of
Congressional appropriations is no longer fully a political question, but has
become to some extent subject to judicial limitation.
Yet another fact was held to invalidate the legislation involved in the
Butler case. It coerced farmers into complying with federal agricultural regu-
lations. s Though the relation by which the benefits were given was contrac-
tual, the Court held that the regulation was not in fact voluntary because the
price of non-compliance was loss of benefits.rO Again the dissenters expressed
serious objection, holding that threat of loss, not hope of gain, was the essence
of economic coercion.' c° Even admitting there was an element of coercion, they
argued, it is to be admitted that Congress can regulate intrastate activities as
an incident of the legitimate exercise of the commerce power and the power to
levy duties on imports.' cl If, then, the power to spend is a delegated power
of equal dignity with the others in the control of the Congress, is not the same
degree of intrastate regulation incidental? 0 2
And if the states, by contract, can delegate a measure of their power to each
other or to the federal government, may not individuals likewise submit upon
an analogous contractual basis, fulfilling certain conditions in return for grants
of money? Questions like the foregoing arise from the diametrically opposed
opinions in the Butler case. Both opinions agree, however, that if the contract
were entirely voluntary, the money could be spent.O They differ as to the fact
of coercion under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
(2). The Social Security Act Cases
The Supreme Court has recently held constitutional certain provisions of
the Social Security Act' 64 analogous to the invalidated sections of the Agricul-
cultural Adjustment Act. Title I'6 of the Social Security Act provides for the
payment of old-age benefits to numerous classes of workers who shall obtain the
age of sixty-five. Title VIll' GG imposes a tax on employers and employes, but
153. See 297 U. S. 1, 71 (1936).
159. Ibid.
160. See id., at 81.
161. See id., at 84, citing Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912); Shreveport Rate
Case, 234 U. S. 342 (1913); Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 49 (1932).
162. In the Butler case, supra, at 85, Stone, J., said: "The only condusion to bl drawn
is that results become lawful when they are incidents of those power3 but unlawful when
incident to the similarly granted power to tax and spend."
163. See 297 U. S. 1, 71, 81 (1936).
164. 49 STAT. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. Chap. 7 (1935).
Title II, 49 STAT. 622, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 401 et seq. (1935) and Title VI9H, 49 Sr,%T. 636,
42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001 et seq. (1935) were upheld in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619
(1937); Title 111, 49 Star. 626, 42 U. S. C. A. § S01 (1935) and Title LX, 49 STAT. 639,
42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1101 et seq. (1935) were upheld in Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S. 548 (1937).
165. 49 STAT. 622, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 401 et seq. (1935).
166. 49 STAT. 636, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001 et seq. (1935).
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the proceeds, unlike those collected under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, are
placed in the general treasury,1 6 7 to be transferred at some future time to an
"Old-Age Reserve Account" and to be withdrawn as needed to make the re-
quired payments. 68 Suit was brought by a stockholder against a corporation
to restrain the payment of the tax and the deducting of the employe's contri-
bution from wages. 69
While the Court could in all probability have declined to hear the case, 170
the fact that the government had not challenged the remedy and had in fact
urged that the validity of the statute be determined constrained the Court to
decide the controversy by deciding the constitutionality of the Act.171
In sustaining the challenged provisions under the General Welfare Clause,
the Court made a statement that will undoubtedly be the basis for future de-
cisions.
"Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow
or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being
of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times."'172
Holding with older cases that the wisdom of the Act was not for judicial con-
sideration, 78 the majority measured the validity of the statute by a pragmatic
standard and decided that the states of themselves could not deal effectively
with the problem of security for the aged.174
In a companion decision,17 5 the Court sustained the constitutionality of
Titles IH176 and IX177 of the same Act. Title III grants to states who comply
with the Social Security Act in the enactment of unemployment compensation
laws within the state, certain monies for "Unemployment Compensation Ad-
ministration"; Title IX imposes a tax on employers of eight or more, the pro-
ceeds, like those under Title II, being placed in the general treasury and with-
drawn at a future time. The employer is allowed a credit of 90%G, however, if
his state has enacted an unemployment insurance law, and he is paying a state
tax under it. The tax is imposed throughout the country, but the money is
167. 49 STAT. 637, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1007 (1935).
168. 49 STAT. 622, 42 U. S. C. A. § 401 (1935).
169. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937).
170. Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing the majority opinion in the Helvering case, ex-
pressed his personal opinion that petitioner had no standing in court. The action was
equitable in nature, an injunction being solight; in his opinion, the legal remedy was
sufficient. 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937). It would seem that the Court could have refused
to hear the case on the authority of Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra, p. 000. The contested
statute in the Helvpring case was analogous to that considered in Massachusetts v. Mellon
in that the revenue derived through taxation under the statute was placed in the general
treasury, and not in a specific fund. Thus petitioner could not trace the money paid over
by it to the government into any expenditure considered unconstitutional.
171. 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937).
172. See id., at 641.
173. See ii.L at 644.
174. See id., at 641-643..
175. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
176. 49 STAT. 626, 42 U. S. C. A. § 501 (1935),
177. 49 STAT. 639, 42 U. $. C A. § 1101 (1935).
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granted to the state only upon the state's enactment of a state law-tB
Brushing aside arguments that the reserved powers of the states had been
invaded and that the measure were coercive upon the states, the Court stated
that
"it is too late today for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a
crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed
and their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of
the general welfare,"1 79
citing United States v. Butler. The provisions requiring the states to pass
certain laws in order to obtain grants are held a mere inducement to the states
to enact unemployment insurance legislation, and not a coercive measure
invading the administrative powers of the states.
"To hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the
law into endless difficulties." 8s
Rather it is to be emphasized that the state has full freedom in the type of
legislation it wishes to enact; in the method of disbursement of the moneys
received; and in the retention or abolition of the statute itself. 18 This right
of choice is held to be such an exercise of the free will of the state as to destroy
any contention that the challenged portions of the Act were coercive a's
It would seem that the Social Security Act cases have, for the most part,
overruled the spirit of the decision in the Butler case. In the last analysis,
the only distinction upon which the contradictory results of the cases can be
based is that the proceeds of the tax exacted in the Butler case did not reach
the federal treasury, while those of the Social Security Act cases did. In all
the cases, it would seem, the tax imposed was legitimate; 8 3 in all, the purpose
to which the money was to be put was the alleviation of a national evil; in all,
conditions were imposed upon the recipients of the grants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The numerous dissenting opinions in the new cases involving the power to
spend; 1s 4 the diametrically opposed conclusions reached upon identical sets of
178. 49 STAT. 503, 42 U. S. C. A. § 503 (1935).
179. See 301 U. S. 548, 586 (1937).
ISO. See id., at 589.
181. See id., at 593-596.
182. See id., at 596. Dissenting opinions argued strongly that the Act deprived the !tate
of their proper administrative functions and powers in a field where they alone have
jurisdiction. The remainder of the Social Security Act, relating to direct grants to the
states for vocational rehabilitation, aid to dependent children, and maternal and child
welfa-re [42 U. S. C. A. Chap. 7, Titles IV, 49 STAT. 627, V, 49 STAT. 629, X, 49 STrT. 645,
X, 49 STAT. 647 (1935)], is not likely to be challenged, under Massachusetts v. Mellon,
because there is no specific tax imposed to pay the expenses involved in theze activities.
183. Although the validity of the tax in the Butler case was not decided, such an ex-
cise would seem constitutional in view of the later case of Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U. S. 308 (1937), upholding a processing tax on cocoanut oil. See dicu-on
note 150, supra.
184. As to whether housing is a public purpose within the general welfare: United
19381
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facts in the lower federal courts; 185 the bitter argument over the significance
of the "general welfare" clause in its present application 18 -all these lead to
the conclusion that there is now revealed a new field of constitutional law, as
yet hardly charted. Fundamental questions, involving basic concepts in the
federal form of government, are brought forward for the first time in the cases
decided under one portion of the Constitution hardly considered by the courts
until very recent times.
First: To what extent will the courts replace the ballot-box as the deter-
minant of the validity of Congressional expenditure?
Second: To what extent will the courts take jurisdiction to decide the con-
stitutionality of appropriation statutes?
Third: What further socio-economic legislation will be a valid exercise of
the power to spend for the general welfare?18 7
Fourth: To what further extent can the federal government further control
the activities of states and individuals within the states through the making
of contracts imposing conditions in return for grants of money?1 88
States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, Ky., 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th,
1935); as to whether resettlement is within the general welfare: Franklin Township v.
Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1936). The Butler case and the Social Security Act
cases are other excellent examples.
185. The numerous decisions in the lower courts over loans and grants to municipalities
for the construction of municipal powe plants are an apt illustration. See casges in note
112, supra.
186. Contrast the frank expressions of Stone, J., in the Butler case; of McReynolds and
Sutherland, J. J., in Helvering v. Davis; of Allen, J., in United States v. Certain Lands
in the City of Louisville, Ky., 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) and of Stephens, J.,
in Franklin Township v. Tugweli, 85 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1936), with the prevalllng
opinion in each case.
187. Most recent is the enactment by Congress of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, Pub. Act, 640 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938). § 347 of the Act provides for referenda
of farmers who are growers of each commodity covered by the Act, and provides that
the provisions of the Act shall not go into effect unless two-thirds of the farmers affected
signify their approval. Benefits are paid in return for crop curtailment as under the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Penalties are imposed for non-compliance with farm
marketing quotas under § 347.
The new Act is a systematic endeavor to control production of basic agricultural com-
modities; in many respects a copy of the act held unconstitutional in the Butler case.
Since there is no provision for the levying of any tax for the payment of benefits, how-
ever, it is difficult at the present time to discover any means whereby the constitutionality
of the measure can be determined.
188. Note the statement of Madison, 2 ANNALS or CoNoRss, (1791), quoted by Corwin,
The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act (1923) 36 HARv. L. Rav. $48,
550: "Interference with the powers of the states is no constitutional criterion of the powers
of Congress. If the power is not given, Congress cannot exercise it; if given, they may
exercise it, although it shall interfere with the laws or even the constitutions of the states."
In 1934, Justice Sutherland was the author of the broad statement that taxes might be
sustained "although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting other ends which, con-
sidered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legis-
lation directly addressed to their accomplishment." Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40,
45 (1934).
[Vol. 7
1938] COMMENTS 417
The answers are in the future. What new legislation the Congres3 may enact
in the name of general welfare no one may guess. One may venture into the
field of conjecture, however, to state that as Congress seeks to expand its
sphere of domination, the courts will move to let down their self-made barrier
of "political question" and will take it upon themselves to decide the validity
of Congressional "general welfare" legislation in a correspondingly wider field.
It is submitted that the true worth of the courts as a check upon ill-advised
legislation is thus demonstrated. The stabilizing influence of judicial decision
will be necessary before a valid limitation upon the terms "general welfare of
the United States" can be determined.
INN IEP'S RIGHT To EXCLUDE OR EJECT GusTs.-The duty of inn-
keepers to accommodate and serve all applicants, while unrecognized by the
Roman Law,' has for centuries been affirmed and enforced in England2 and
America.3 Though expressed as a universal obligation it is not without its
limitations. To better understand the situations wherein the proprietor of a
hotel may refuse the hospitality of his house or eject a patron who has been
admitted, they will be viewed in the perspective of our tenuous knowledge
regarding the genesis of this singular duty. No precise statement of the reasons
which evoked this law is found in the early cases themselves and a departure
from the decisions leaves the investigator groping in the mists of antiquity.
Origin of Public Service Duty
Monopoly has been pointed. to as the parent of this public service duty. It
is argued that necessity for a service brought upon those dispensing it a duty
to serve the public, and that the division of business into public and private
was based on economic grounds.4 This argument is attacked on the ground
that the cases establishing the obligation make no allusion to monopoly.5 In
fact, historical evidence shows that while common surgeons, barbers, and
victuallers were under the obligation of indiscriminate service, there were
numerous practitioners in these trades.6 Moreover, not the innkeeper, but the
common innkeeper, was regarded as a public servant.7
1. 3 ScoTr, Tmm CIVIL LAw (1932) 134; RADn, Ro " LAw (1927) § 94.
2. Anonymous, Keilwey 50, p1. 4, 72 Eng. Reprints 203 (K. B. 140); Gordon v.
Silber 25 Q. B. D. 491 (1890); 3 Br. Coistf. *164.
3. Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837); State v. Steele, 105
N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478'(1890); see L. E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 754, 60
S. W. (2d) 32, 34 (1933).
Some states have incorporated the common law rule of indiscriminate service into
their statutes. GA. CoDE (1933) § 52-103; ILL. Rrv. SrT.%. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38,
§ 125; CONSTTUiON AND STATTS or LouISAA (1920) § 457; DIP. Rmr. STr. (1930) c.
36, § 5; Nm. Co . STAT. (1929) § 23-101; N. Y. CnV7L RImnrs Lw.' (1935) § 40;
OHIo Gm,. CODE (Page, 1926) § 12940.
4. 1 WvAx, PuBlic SERvicE ConOaOATios (1911) § 1; Arterburton, The Origin and
First Test of Public Callings (1927) 75 U. or Pa. L. REv. 411.
5. Adler, Business Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HInv. L. R'. 135, 156 n. 76.
6. See id., at 155, n. 76. It is here pointed out that in the town of Beverley barbers
and surgeons were numerous enough to impose taxes on others entering it.
7. Adler, supra, note 5, at 156, n. 76. The necessity of alleging that the inn was "corn-
